DOGE Employees Had Access to Nuclear Secrets

Controversy Surrounding DOGE Staff Access to Classified Networks

Two members of Elon Musk's Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) gained access to highly sensitive networks related to America's nuclear weapons, NPR reported on April 28.
The individuals, Luke Farritor, a former SpaceX intern, and Adam Ramada, a Miami-based venture capitalist, were granted accounts on these classified systems for at least two weeks. 
According to two sources familiar with the situation, neither Farritor nor Ramada had prior experience with nuclear weapons or handling classified data before their roles at DOGE.
Read on to find out about DOGE's secret nuclear rendezvous. 
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Initial Denials and Clarifications

At first, a spokesperson from the Department of Energy (DOE) denied that Luke Farritor and Adam Ramada had accessed the classified networks. 
"This reporting is false. No DOGE personnel have accessed these NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration] systems," the spokesperson said, adding that the two individuals worked within the agency for several days before departing in February. 
However, the spokesperson later clarified that while accounts were created for the DOGE staffers, they were never activated or accessed.
Despite these denials, two sources with knowledge of the situation confirmed that Farritor's and Ramada's names appeared in the directories of the classified networks. These networks, which are only accessible from secure rooms designated for handling classified information, are used by thousands of employees working on nuclear weapons at U.S. facilities.

Details on the Classified Networks and Their Importance

The networks in question are used by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Department of Defense. One of these, the NNSA Enterprise Secure Network, handles "restricted data" on nuclear weapons including details on weapons designs and special materials. This network is integral to the flow of sensitive technical information between the NNSA, the nation's nuclear weapons laboratories and the facilities responsible for maintaining and upgrading the nuclear arsenal.
The second network, SIPRNet (Secret Internet Protocol Router Network), facilitates communications about nuclear weapons between the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense. This network also handles broader classified information deemed "secret," which could harm national security if exposed.
Access to these systems typically requires "Q" clearance — the highest security clearance at the DOE — a process that can take a significant amount of time but may be expedited in certain cases. 
However, experts suggest that even if Luke Farritor's and Adam Ramada's accounts had been activated, their access would have been limited by the need-to-know principle that governs classified data.

Potential Implications of the Access

While the two DOGE employees' access to these classified systems did not automatically grant them access to all files, the presence of their accounts is seen as an escalation of DOGE's role within the DOE. Sources familiar with the matter described this access as a "toehold" that could allow DOGE staffers to request classified information, potentially deepening their involvement in sensitive government matters.
The DOE has not clarified why these accounts were created, but experts speculate that DOGE employees may have sought access to discuss program details and future budget priorities. Some portions of the nuclear weapons budget are unclassified, but many details — especially related to funding — may be classified. 
Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project, suggested that DOGE's access could have been related to these budget discussions.

Broader Concerns and Growing Scrutiny

The news of the unauthorized access to classified systems comes amid broader concerns about DOGE's handling of sensitive data across government agencies. 
Earlier this month, NPR reported on a whistleblower at the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), who revealed that DOGE employees may have copied and removed sensitive data from internal systems. Suspicious log-in attempts from an IP address in Russia raised further alarms.
Additionally, the controversy surrounding Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth's use of the encrypted messaging app Signal to discuss military operations adds to the growing concerns about the security of sensitive information within the government. 
Hegseth's use of Signal became public after editor-in-chief Jeffrey Goldberg was accidentally included in a group chat.